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There are only two ways for a company like ours to grow.
By exploration success or acquisition. And very simply, you can




The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE' heralds a signifi-
cant shift toward uniform federal regulation of corporate takeover ac-
tivity by means of the tender offer? As a result of this decision,
1. Cochran, Texas Extrepreneur T Boone Pickens Zealous in Risk-Taking, Tulsa World,
Dec. 26, 1982, at L3, col. 6. Pickens, President and Board Chairman of Mesa Petroleum, drew a
lot of attention in a sardine-versus-whale takeover battle with Cities Service. Gulf Oil, in the role
of a "white knight," came to Cities' rescue, only to later yield to Occidental Petroleum's successful
takeover of Cities Service. However, Pickens said "the second place finish wasn't all that bad",
since by losing to Occidental, Mesa got a $40 million gain against a $100 million loss. Id at col. 1.
Gulf Oil was cast in the role of a "white knight" because the terms offered to Cities Service by
Gulf were generally more favorable than those offered by Mesa. Mesa was viewed as a raider, one
whose offer is not attractive to incumbent management. A raider usually looks for a target com-
pany with:
(a) low price-earnings ratio and high book value in relation to market price...
(b) a business that it knows and understands;
(c) no concentrated blocks in inside hands... ; land]
(d) no antitrust or other regulatory problems.
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 46-47 (Supp. 1979).
2. 102 S. Ct. 1229 (1982).
3. "Tender offer" may be defined as an offer to acquire any equity security of a target com-
pany, if after acquisition thereof the offeror would be owner of a certain percentage or more of
any class of securities of that company. See, e.g., Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act, OKLA. STAT. tit.
71, § 433(1) (1981) (offeror would become owner of 10% of any class of securities). A precise
definition of a tender offer has proved to be somewhat elusive. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(b) (1982), provides for federal regulation of tender offers but does not define the term. Its
characteristics, however, were described in the House Report of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce as a "bid by an individual or group to buy shares of a company-usually at a
price above the current market price." H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2811.
It is preferable to use a cash tender offer as opposed to an exchange tender offer if an offeror
desires to acquire (a) a company that does not want to be acquired; (b) a company by an offer that
a majority of the board of directors does not oppose but does not want to sponsor; (c) a company
225
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parochial state interests no longer will be allowed to unduly burden the
national securities market. The means by which a state can protect its
interest in domestic corporations and resident shareholders, therefore,
remain uncertain.
This Comment reviews the economic aspects of takeover regula-
tions, presents the history of state and federal regulation, and explores
the Tenth Circuit's application of the MITE analysis to the Oklahoma
case, Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co. 4 Finally, this Comment
examines the future of state regulation of bidder activity and target
defense tactics in the takeover process and proposes methods of state
control that remain viable in light of recent judicial holdings.
II. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TENDER OFFERS
Traditionally less expensive and less time consuming than mergers
or gradual market acquisitions, tender offers have become a popular
means of acquiring control of publicly held corporations.' There is
considerable disagreement, however, about the economic consequences
before a third party can perfect a competing offer, and (d) a company in trouble when there is not
sufficient time for a merger. LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 3.
4. Nos., 82-1838; 82-2614; 82-2615; 83-1082 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1983) (available Sept. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file).
5. See ARANOW, EINHORN, & BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL V (1977). The following factors have been suggested to explain the increasing
popularity of tender offers:
(1) Increased access to cash resulting from greater corporate liquidity and readily avail-
able credit;
(2) Relatively low price-earnings and cash or quick assets ratios, as well as compara-
tively low book values;
(3) Other means of obtaining control of the corporation, such as through proxy con-
tests, require those seeking control to convince shareholders that they are better able to
handle the affairs of the company than is the incumbent management, whereas tender
offers appeal to shareholders on a strictly monetary basis;
(4) The increasing respectability of tender offers as a takeover technique, along with
greater sophistication and knowledge regarding the use of the tender offer.
Bunch, Edgar v. MITE Corporator" A Proposed Analysis, 17 TULSA L.J. 229, 233 n.37 (1981)
(citations omitted); see also Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Consttutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. I n.2 (1976) (depressed market conditions suggested as
accounting for the increase in takeover attempts, "since an offeror can pay a premium above the
market price for share of a profitable company and still get a good return on its money"); LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 39 (listing additional factors: (a) desire for diversification, par-
ticularly by companies with low return on investment, (b) fear of foreign investors, (c) surplus of
dollars in foreign hands, and (d) acceptability of the aggressive takeover resulting from willingness
of investment bankers to act for raiders and willingness of established companies to be raiders).
One study offers the following statistics regarding tender offers:
The tender offer as a vehicle for corporate control is a fiercesome weapon. . . . [l]n
just the last two years, at least 313 corporations have had to defend themselves against
2
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TENDER OFFERS
of tender offers.6 Some commentators believe that tender offers create
substantial economic gains for both the bidders' and the target compa-
nies' shareholders and should be encouraged.7 Implicit in this ap-
proach is the belief that the market is efficient and that economic
benefit can be measured in terms of the increases in market value of the
shares of the acquiring and the acquired corporations at the time of the
acquisition.8
Believing that a company's market value is tied directly to the ef-
fectiveness of its management, these commentators argue that the effi-
cient market discounts for suboptimal management. Corporate
management is cast in the role of the shareholders' agent. The threat of
an unfriendly takeover is perceived as a control over the agent's con-
duct that benefits the shareholders.' Accordingly, "a tender offer pre-
mium reflects the raider's judgment of the extent of the market
discount for suboptimal management and the value of the target's busi-
ness under the presumably more efficient and honest management of
the raider . . . ... 1 Thus, target shareholders benefit either from the
incentive for increased effectiveness of management that the threat of a
tender offer provides or from the realization of the premium market
value of their stock through the tender offer transaction. As a result of
their bias toward the incentive that tender offers provide in an efficient
another corporation's public attempts to take them over, and in some cases against at-
tempts by more than one corporation. ....
. . . Overall, the total percentage of unsuccessful tender offers during the last five
years has remained relatively constant, ranging from 16 percent to 20.9 percent.
If one analyzes the entire period from 1956-1977, it can be said with assurance that
if attacked, chances of successfully defeating the bid remain one in five, or 20 percent.
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 38 (quoting Austin, Study Reveals Trends in Tactics,
Premiums, Success Rates in Offers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 3).
6. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, SEC REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 7
(1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel,
Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981) (arguing
that takeovers are economically beneficial) with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom;
An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981) (arguing takeovers are not always economi-
cally beneficial) and LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1 (same).
7. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7; Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Ef-
fects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. LAW & ECON. 371, 381 (1980).
8. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7; Jarrell & Bradley, supra note 7, at
381. According to empirical data, "in the 60 to 120 days during which a takeover transaction is
considered the target company's shares rise an average of 30% while the bidder's shares increase
an average of 3-4%." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7 n.6; see also Bradley,
Inlefirm Cash Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345, 346 (1980)
(acquired targets earned average premiums of 49% while acquiring firms earned average increase
in market value of own stock of about 9%).
9. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1735.
10. Lipton, supra note 6, at 1024 n.30.
1983]
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marketplace, market theory advocates are generally opposed to govern-
ment regulation of tender offers, arguing that the costs of regulation
often exceed the benefits and that the real beneficiaries of regulation
are the regulated firms rather than the shareholders.II
At the opposite end of the scale are those commentators who be-
lieve that hostile takeovers are socially and economically detrimental.12
Arguments supporting this view include the claims that (1) the mere
threat of a hostile takeover diverts management from long-range plan-
ning activity and the exercise of good business judgment; 3 (2) arbi-
trageurs,' 4 and perhaps even tender offerors themselves,'- are
indifferent to the performance of the acquired company;' 6 and (3) the
process of tender bidding diverts resources from capital investment. 7
Commentators asserting these arguments take issue with the efficient
market theory, declaring that:
[R]eadily available long-term credit, the advantages of bor-
rowing in an inflationary period, the lack of return on invest-
ment in new facilities in many industries equivalent to the
return from a takeover, and the "social acceptability" of take-
overs starting with the 1973-4 decisions of major companies
and leading investment bankers to engage in takeovers, have
had much more to do with takeover activity than the efficient
market theory or any effort by raiders to replace "suboptimal"
management. 18
Furthermore, these commentators believe that because of the negative
social and economic effects attributable to the hostile tender offer, man-
agement's defense arsenal should be augmented by state regulatory
statutes. 19
11. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 74.
12. Id at7.
13. Id at 8; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1743-44; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 110 (1979).
14. Arbitrageurs are market professionals who purchase the shares of the target in the
market in order to tender to the offeror, thereby narrowing the spread between the pre-
offer market price and the offer price and providing market liquidity at or near the offer
price for those who do not wish to wait for, or take the risk of, the consummation of the
tender offer.
LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 20.
15. It is questionable whether the tender offerors should be included in this criticism, "since
the offerors [usually] plan to make a profit by holding the stock, perhaps merging with the target,
and improving the target's performance in order to recoup the premium." Easterbrook & Fisehel,
supra note 6, at 1744 n.32.
16. Lipton, supra note 13, at 104, 113-15.
17. Lipton, supra note 6, at 1024 n.30.
18. Id
19. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1749.
[Vol. 19:225
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A substantial majority of the Security and Exchange Commis-
sion's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers (Advisory Committee)
believes that the economic data used in evaluating tender offer ramifi-
cations is problematic and does not support either of the extreme views
on the economic effects of tender offers.20 Advisory Committee mem-
bers do not concur with commentators' claims that substantial eco-
nomic benefits or detriments of takeover activities have been
conclusively established. Some members express doubt that short-term
market price increases support the conclusion that takeovers provide
economic benefits, suggesting instead that the principal basis for set-
tling the macro-economic issue should be a "long term evaluation of
the economic soundness of the acquisition, as measured by the opera-
tions, conditions and productivity of the combined enterprises."21
The Advisory Committee believes that while some takeovers prove
beneficial and others disappointing, the result is primarily attributable
to the business judgment reflected in combining the specific enterprises
and only secondarily traceable to the method of acquisition.22 Accord-
ingly, on the issue of government regulation of tender offers, the Com-
mittee recommends:
The purpose of the regulatory scheme should be neither to
promote nor to deter takeovers; such transactions and related
activities are a valid method of capital allocation, so long as
they are conducted in accordance with the laws deemed nec-
essary to protect the interests of shareholders and the integrity
and efficiency of the capital markets.2 3
III. REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
A. Federal Regulation
Neither the federal nor the state governments originally regulated
tender offers. The provisions of the Securities Act of 193324 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 193425 ('34 Act) required disclosures only
from insiders trading in securities.2 6 A tender offeror could demand
20. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 8.
21. Id
22. Id at 9.
23. Id
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77yyy (1982).
25. Id at §§ 78a-78111.
26. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2811, 2814 (gap in securities laws did not afford shareholders protection from takeover
bids); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62
1983]
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that a tender of stock be irrevocable, could purchase first-tendered
shares if the offer were oversubscribed, and could restrict the period
during which the offer would be outstanding.27 Such conditions in-
duced investor panic. Shareholders were afraid they might miss the
opportunity if they did not tender quickly.28 Once they did tender,
their shares were locked into the tender offer regardless of any subse-
quent changes in the terms of the offer or any second thoughts on the
part of the shareholder.
Advocates of federal regulation were disturbed that the securities
laws did not require an offeror to disclose its identity, the source of its
funds, the identity of its associates, and most importantly, its intentions
upon gaining control of the target corporation. 29  Therefore, in re-
sponse to the fear generated by the increasing use of tender offers and
the obvious disclosure gap, 0 Senator Williams introduced a proposal
in 1965 to protect incumbent management from the "industrial sabo-
tage" inflicted upon "proud old companies" by the corporate raider.3'
Congress adopted the resultant regulatory scheme known as the Wil-
liams Act as an amendment to the '34 Act.32
Although there has been debate concerning legislative intent in
formulating the Williams Act, the weight of the evidence favors the
CORNELL L. REV. 213, 214 (1977). For further discussion of the gaps in disclosure, see Sowards &
Mofsky, Corporate Take-over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
499 (1967).
27. Bunch, supra note 5, at 234-35.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2812.
29. See S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1967).
30. See MITE, 102 S. Ct. at 2635-6; Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977); S. REP.
No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1967).
31. 111 CONG. REc. 28,257 (1965). Introducing his proposal, Senator Williams stated, "In
recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white-collar
pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in many cases, then sold
or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot among themselves." 111 CONG.
REC. 28,257 (1965).
Senator Williams' first proposal required that the offeror give a 20-day advance notice to the
target corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of his intent to make a
tender offer. The proposal did not come out of committee. Moylan, State Regulation of Tender
Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 688 (1975). After much discussion by the SEC, various national
securities exchanges, the industry, and the academic community, the prevailing view supported
the economic utility of tender offers in providing a mechanism to dispose of inefficient manage-
ment as well as a means of obtaining an investment position in a company with relative ease.
"Thus, the focus of the legislation changed from one of protecting incumbent management to one
of providing 'full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same time provid-
ing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.'" Id (quoting 113
CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Senator Williams)).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
[Vol. 19:225
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argument that it was designed to serve a dual purpose: (1) to provide
protection for investors; and (2) to maintain a neutral balance between
the tender offeror and the target company management.33 The investor
is afforded protection through the disclosure provisions of the Williams
Act that require the tender offeror to reveal its background and iden-
tity; the source of funds to be used in making the purchase; the purpose
of the purchase, including any plans to liquidate the company or make
major changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the offeror's
holdings in the target company. 4
The procedural requirements of the Williams Act serve to decrease
investor panic by providing that all tendered shares must be purchased
at the same price, and if an offeror's price is increased, those who have
already tendered receive the benefit of the increase. Moreover, the
Act provides that when the number of shares tendered exceeds the
number of shares sought in the offer, those shares tendered during the
first ten days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata basis.36 The
provisions of the Williams Act also diminish an investor's sense of be-
ing locked in by permitting shareholders to withdraw at any time until
the expiration of seven days after copies of the offer are first published,
sent or given to shareholders 7-and if the offeror has not yet
purchased the shares, at any time after sixty days from the commence-
ment of the offer.38
If by means of the offer the offeror would acquire more than five
33. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2811, 2813; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1967); see Aranow & Einhorn, State
Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 767, 768 (1971); Langevoort, supra note
26, at 216-18; Moylan, supra note 31, at 688; Wilner & Landy, supra note 5, at 2; Comment, The
Effect ofthe New SEC Rules on the Constitutionality 0/State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 913, 917-18 (1979-80); cf. AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 938 (S.D. Ohio
1979) (sole purpose of Williams Act was investor protection, and neutrality was merely an ancil-
lary matter); Bunch, supra note 5, at 241-42 (Williams Act designed solely for investor protection);
Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J.
510, 521-22 (1979) (same).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1982). The Williams Act also
contains a general antifraud provision which has been interpreted to require disclosure of material
information known to the offeror even if disclosure is not otherwise required. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)
(1982), construed in Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
36. Id at § 78n(d)(6).
37. Id at § 78n(d)(5). SEC Rule 14(d)7 adds additional withdrawal rights: tendering share-
holders may withdraw their shares up to 15 days after commencement of the date of the offer and
up to 10 business days after the commencement of another bidder's tender offer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-7 (1982).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
1983]
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percent of any class of equity security in the target company,39 other
provisions of the Williams Act demand that the offeror file its informa-
tion statement with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC)
upon commencement of a tender offer. Concurrently, the offeror must
publish or send similar information to the target company shareholders
as well as to the target company itself.40 While the requisites of the Act
command the offeror to disclose relevant information to the target com-
pany and its shareholders, offeror ability to move secretly and an-
nounce its offers suddenly is preserved.4 State statute requirements,
on the other hand, frequently have been criticized for unduly burden-
ing and delaying the offeror's right to secrecy and speed.
B. State Regulation
The first state statute that regulated tender offers42 was enacted
four months prior to the enactment of the Williams Act. In general, the
alleged purpose of state takeover statutes has been to protect target
company shareholders by supplementing the protection provided by
the Williams Act.43 Additional interests propounded in support of
state regulation of tender offers include local concern for the takeover
bid's effect on (1) competition, employment, and union, political, and
social matters; (2) the target's management, employees, customers, sup-
pliers, and creditors; (3) local, versus centralized, control of industries;
(4) limits on the debt-equity ratio of the offeror; and (5) the state's in-
terest in regulating the internal affairs of domestic corporations."
39. Id at § 78n(d)(l); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1982). Equity securities are limited to those
that (I) are registered pursuant to § 12 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982); (2) would
have been required to be so registered but for the insurance company equity security exemption of
§ 12(6)(2)(6) of the Exchange Act, id at § 781(g)(2)(G); or (3) are issued by a registered closed-end
investment company under the Investment Company Act of 1940, id at §§ 80a-! to -52.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1982). For a detailed analysis of the
Williams Act, see Fogelson, Wenig & Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game.- The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON LEois. 409
(1980).
41. Speed and secrecy are the two major virtues of the tender offer. The greater the amount
of time the target company has with respect to a given offer, the greater the number of options it
can utilize to thwart the offer. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 5, at 14 & n.78. In a bid delayed
by virtue of the Ohio State Takeover Statute, Microdot Inc. was able to arrange a friendly merger
with a third party at $21 per share while the tender offer of General Cable at $17 per share was
still in court. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1976, at L42, col. 4.
42. VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978) (effective Mar. 5, 1968).
43. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 1211h, § 137.51-1 (Supp. 1983-84) ("to protect the interests
of Illinois securityholders of companies having a close connection with this State without unduly
impeding take-over offers ... so as to strike a balance that does not favor either management of a
target company or an offeror").
44. Justice Powell, concurring in part in MITE, supported the basic idea that state regulation
[Vol. 19:225
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The state's statutory definition of the term "target company" pri-
marily determines the state's jurisdiction over tender offer activity.45
Some statutes46 define target companies as only those companies incor-
porated in the state. Other statutes47 are applicable to companies that
are incorporated in the state and also do business or have substantial
assets there. In some states,48 the target company need not be incorpo-
rated in the state if the company has its principal place of business or
substantial assets there.
A tender offer to a target company falling within the ambit of stat-
utory jurisdiction triggers the requirement of compliance with each
governing state's statutory provisions. Most state statutes require the
filing of disclosure statements with the state securities commission
before the offer can become effective.49  Some statutory disclosure re-
quirements are similar to those of the Williams Act, while others re-
quire more extensive disclosure." Once the filings have been made,
some statutes allow the state securities commissions to order a hearing
is important when the consequences of a corporate takeover may be adverse to general public
interest.
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations
tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters are
transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and
locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management
personnel-many of whom have provided community leadership-may move to the new
corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and educational life-
both in terms of leadership and financial support-also tend to diminish when there is a
move of corporate headquarters.
MITE, 102 S. Ct. at 2643; see Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legisla-
tion: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 722, 756 (1970).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02; see also State Take-Over Statutes and the Wil-
liams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187, 194 (1976) (report of Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and
Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee) [hereinafter cited as Proxy
Subcommittee].
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1982); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778
(1979).
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1981 & Supp. 1983-84); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-0.5 to -11 (Bums 1983); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to
-908 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1983).
48. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.51-.70 (Smith Hurd Supp. 1983-84); OaLA. STAT. tit. 71,
§ 433(4) (1981).
49. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.2(5) (1980 & Supp. 1983) (information must be filed
10 days before the offer can become effective); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 417E-2(2) (1976) (5 days);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3771(1) (1979) (20 days); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 47-32-21 (Supp. 1982)
(10 days). Under the Williams Act there is no precommencement notification requirement. Prior
notification provides the target company with additional time to combat the offer.
50. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1902 (1977 & Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121
§ 137.57E (Smith-Hurd 1983-84) (requiring that financial statements be filed); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:5-3 (West 1983-84) (requiring audited and unaudited financial information); OKLA. STAT. tit.
71, § 436 (1981) (requiring financial statement).
1983]
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on the offer.5' In a few cases, the hearings may be held at the request
of the target company.5 2 The purpose of the hearing may be to deter-
mine whether the offeror has failed to disclose sufficient information53
or whether the offer is substantively fair. 4
The state statutes prescribe various substantive requirements con-
cerning the minimum offering period, 5  extension of this period after
an amendment in the filing,56 the withdrawal rights of shareholders,5 7
and the pro rata take-up. 8 The statutes also contain enforcement pro-
visions and remedies, generally empowering the state securities com-
mission to issue cease and desist orders and injunctions.59 Statutory
violations may result in criminal prosecution, fines, or civil liability.60
IV. JUDICIAL REACTION TO STATE REGULATION OF TENDER
OFFERS
State regulation of tender offers has generated substantial contro-
versy and criticism. Between the time of the Fifth Circuit's decision in
51. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.54E (Smith-Hurd 1983-84); OKLA. STAT. tit.
71, § 437(b) (1981).
52. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57A (Smith-Hurd 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1281 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §421-A:5 (1983); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(ii) (Supp.
1983).
53. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 437(A)(2) (1981).
54. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57E (Smith-Hurd 1983-84).
55. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(b) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (requires a 15 day mini-
mum offering period); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon 1983-84) (offer becomes effective
in 20 days). The Williams Act does not specify any minimum period for which an offer must
remain open. A majority of the Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers did not
approve of the requirement that an offeror give prior notice. They preferred, if necessary as a
compromise to accomplish the purpose of providing a longer period for review, to extend the
minimum periods within which an offer, once made, must remain open. Proxy Subcommittee,
supra note 45, at 195.
56. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN § 502.212(8)(b) (Cumin. Supp. 1983-84) (14 days); OKLA
STAT. tit. 71, § 435(B) (1981) (5 days).
57. The Oklahoma statute did not include a provision covering withdrawal rights; therefore
the Williams Act requirements would have governed shareholders' withdrawal rights. Cf. CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(c) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (under certain circumstances withdrawal within
15 days and at any time after 35 days from the date of invitation).
Certainly in the case of an offer for any and all shares, only the less sophisticated stock-
holders are likely to tender within the first seven days, or indeed at any time until shortly
before the expiration of the offer. Institutional investors and other professionals tend to
hold back, waiting to see if a better offer will be made. A requirement that a tendering
stockholder be permitted to withdraw at any time within the first 15 days of an offer
would put the ordinary stockholder on a more even footing.
Proxy Subcommittee, supra note 45, at 195.
58. "The Williams Act requires proration for all shares tendered within the first ten days of
an offer, thereafter, the offeror can take up shares on a first come, first served basis." Proxy Sub-
committee, supra note 45, at 196.
59. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 448 (1981).
60. Id at § 442.
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Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell6 and the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Edgar v. MITE, 2 at least thirteen courts found that a state take-
over statute excessively burdened interstate commerce or was
preempted by the Williams Act.63 Courts in at least ten other cases
recognized possible preemption or commerce clause problems with
state takeover statutes but declined or were unable to rule on these is-
sues because of the procedural posture of the cases at bar.6" Two other
decisions upheld state statutes as long as the statutes were interpreted
and applied by the state securities administrators in a manner consis-
tent with the Williams Act.65 Decisions in two cases sustained the va-
lidity of the state statute.66
In general, the judicial approach to state regulation did not pro-
61. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
62. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
63. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey statute);
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Illinois statute); Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V.,
533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (Florida statute); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D.
Nev. 1981) (Nevada statute); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania
statute); Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Ohio
statute); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %
97,804 (D.S.C. 1980) (South Carolina statute); Brascan, Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-82 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,247 (E.D. La. April 30, 1979) (Louisiana statute); Dart Indus. Inc.
v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 302 N.W.2d
596 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (Michigan statute); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 97,694 (N.C. Super. Ct. April 18, 1980) (North Carolina
Statute); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) T 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (Oklahoma statute).
64. Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115 (D. Del. 1981) (Delaware statute); Ex rel
Krouse v. SEC. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,688 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15,
1980) (Ohio statute); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D. Mo.),
a'd 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979) (Missouri statute); Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Connelly, 473 F. Supp.
1157 (D. Mass. 1979) (Massachusetts statute); UV Indus., Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D.
Me. 1979) (Maine statute); S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978)
(Massachusetts statute); Sheffield v. Consol. Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 276 S.E.2d 422 (1981)
(North Carolina statute); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980) (Dela-
ware statute); Unitrode Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 399 N.E.2d 5 (Mass. 1980) (Massachu-
setts statute); UV Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel Corp., [1978-81 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 71,466 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 28, 1979) (New York statute).
65. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,805 (D. Conn. 1980) (Connecticut statute will not be invalidated on preemption or commerce
clause grounds unless state administrator fails to exercise his statutory discretion to apply the
statute's waiting period and hearing and withdrawal provisions in such a way as to avoid conflict-
ing with the Williams Act and impermissibly burdening interstate commerce); Sun Life Group,
Inc. v. Standard Life Ins. Co., [1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,314 (S.D.
Ind. Mar. 12, 1980) (no conflict with Rule 14d-2(b) insofar as the state administrator construes the
Indiana Insurance Company Holding Act as permitting a tender offer to commence prior to expi-
ration of the 30-day statutory waiting period so long as the offer is expressly conditioned upon
approval by the administrator).
66. City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aft'd, 633 F.2d 56 (7th
Cir. 1980); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (this decision with
respect to Ohio statute antedated adoption of Rule 14d-2(b); the subsequently adopted rule led to
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vide a precise or consistent framework for analysis of the issue.67 The
Supreme Court's 1982 decision in MITE, however, settled at least one
issue raised by state statutory requirements by holding that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act was unconstitutional on commerce clause
grounds. 68
A. The Supreme Court Decision. Edgar v. MITE
Illinois enacted the Illinois Business Takeover Act (Illinois Act)69
to govern the substantive and procedural aspects of the tender offer
process. In contravention of the Illinois Act, MITE Corporation failed
to file the required disclosures with the Illinois Secretary of State in
preparation for a tender offer to an Illinois corporation; however,
MITE complied fully with the federal disclosure requirements of the
Williams Act.7" When the Secretary of State of Illinois and the target
company notified MITE of their intent to invoke the Illinois Act as a
block to the proposed offer, MITE initiated a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in federal court asking the court to declare the Illinois Act uncon-
stitutional.7' Thereafter, MITE published its tender offer. The district
court found that the Illinois Act impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce,72 and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed.73 James Edgar, Secretary of State of Illinois charged with ad-
ministration and enforcement of the Illinois Act, appealed to the
Supreme Court.
The MITE decision is not a model of judicial unanimity. Five
justices74 held the Illinois Act to be unconstitutional under a commerce
clause analysis based on the balancing test adopted by the Court in
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 71 Under that test, a state statute that indi-
holding in Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.) Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) that
prenotification waiting period was preempted).
67. Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulations: State Responses to MITE and
Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 693 (1981).
68. 102 S. Ct. 2629 (1982).
69. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 , §§ 137.51-.69 (Supp. 1983-84).
70. The Williams Act requires an offeror to file a Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC before com-
mencing an offer. This schedule provides material financial information about the offer. When
the offer commences, the offeror must furnish the information contained in the schedule to the
target and its shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1982).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 2632.
72. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 1979).
73. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
74. Justice White was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Stevens,
and O'Connor. 102 S. Ct. at 2633.
75. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., a state statute would be upheld if it "regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
[Vol. 19:225
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rectly regulates interstate commerce will be held unconstitutional if
"the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits."76 Through its takeover statute, Illinois
attempted to assume the power to govern tender offers nationwide."
Conceivably, the statute could have applied to regulate a tender offer
affecting many states. The Court stated that the putative local benefits
of seeking to protect resident shareholders and regulate the internal af-
fairs of domestic corporations were "insufficient to outweigh the bur-
dens" the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce.7 8 In the Court's
opinion, these interests did not outweigh the deprivation of a share-
holder's opportunity to sell his shares at a premium, the interference
with the reallocation of economic resources to their highest-valued use,
and the reduction of the incentive for incumbent management to per-
form well.79
The Court clearly stated that a "state has no legitimate interest in
protecting non-resident shareholders."" ° Moreover, the Court was un-
convinced by the specious argument that the state statute substantially
enhanced the resident shareholders' position, since the Williams Act
provided the same substantive protections.8 Furthermore, the Court
rejected the contention that the Illinois Act was simply an expression of
the traditional state police power over internal corporate affairs.8 2
"Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third
party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target
company.""3 This justification of the Illinois Act is even more suspect
in light of its extraterritorial effect.
Justice White's analysis discussed the issue of federal preemption
of the Illinois Act under the supremacy clause and outlined the argu-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental. . . unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
Id at 142.
76. Id
77. See infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
78. 102 S. Ct. at 2642; see also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (permit-
ting the individual states to enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state
businesses would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the free trade
which the clause protects); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13 (1928) (Louisi-
ana may not prohibit interstate movement of raw shrimp to favor local packing industries).
79. 102 S. Ct. at 2642. The Supreme Court seems to follow the efficient market theory. See
supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2642.
81. Id
82. Id at 2642-43.
83. Id at 2643.
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ments for holding the Illinois Act to be in direct violation of the com-
merce clause. However, Justice White was unable to secure a majority
of the Court in favor of invalidating the Illinois Act on either of these
grounds. On the other hand, neither were these grounds rejected by a
majority of the Court: three justices determined that the case was moot
and were unwilling to reach the merits.84 Both the supremacy clause
and the commerce clause, therefore, remain potentially applicable in
judicial evaluation of other state takeover statutes.
Critical to any future determination that state regulation of tender
offers is preempted by the Williams Act will be the question of whether
that state's regulation "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purpose and objectives"85 of the Williams Act.
Notwithstanding the Court's prior opinion in Pioer v. Chris- Craft Indus-
tries, Inc. 86 that the sole congressional purpose behind the Williams
Act was shareholder protection, in MITE the Court agreed with the
court of appeals87 that by enacting the Williams Act, "Congress sought
to protect the investor not only by furnishing him with the necessary
information but also by withholding from management or the bidder
any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed
choice." 88
In Justice White's opinion, the Illinois Act upset the balance that
Congress sought to achieve by delaying the tender offer process to the
advantage of incumbent management.8 9 Moreover, he believed that
84. Id at 2648-54. For a thorough discussion of the MITE case, see The Supreme Court 1981
Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 4, 62-71 (1982); Note, State Regulation of Tender Offersfor Insurance
Companies After Edgar v. MITE, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 943 (1983); Note, Edgar v. MITE Corp:
The Death Knell for the Indiana Takeover Offers Act, 16 IND. L. REV. 517 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as The Death Knell].
85. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
86. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
87. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
88. 102 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (citing MITE, 633 F.2d at 496).
89. Id at 2638-39. "In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself 'recognized that delay can
seriously impede a tender offer' and sought to avoid it." Id (quoting Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978)). Delay is "the most potent weapon in a tender offer
fight." MITE, 102 S. Ct. at 2638 n.12; see also Wilner & Landy, supra note 5, at 9-10. According
to the SEC, delay enables a target company to:
(1) repurchase its own securities; (2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; (3) is-
sue additional shares of stock; (4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust viola-
tion should the tender offer succeed; (5) arrange a defensive merger; (6) enter into
restrictive loan agreements; (7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer.
Mite, 102 S. Ct. at 2639 n.13; see Flom, The Role of the Takeover in the American Economp, 32
Bus. LAw. 1297, 1299 (1977). "It is possible that the prospect of delay, together with the opportu-
nity this gives incumbent management to raise defenses, might convince a potential offeror to
refrain from making a tender offer, thereby depriving shareholders of the opportunity to tender
their stock at a premium." Note, supra note 33, at 523. Any such proposition is at best specula-
[Vol. 19:225
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because the Illinois Secretary of State could stop offers he deemed un-
fair, shareholder freedom to make investment decisions was thwarted.9"
Justices Stevens and Powell refused to join the preemption discus-
sion. Justice Stevens stated in his concurrence that he was not per-
suaded that the decision of Congress to follow a policy of neutrality in
the Williams Act was tantamount to a federal prohibition against state
legislation designed to provide special protection for incumbent man-
agement.9 Similarly, Justice Powell stated, "[T]he Williams Act's neu-
trality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to
prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circum-
stances-greater protection to interests that include but often are
broader than those of incumbent management." 92
The Court recognized only the protection of resident shareholders
as a legitimate objective of state regulation.93 Even though MITE
lends support to states seeking to justify local regulation on this basis,
the reasoning of the Court suggests that disclosure or delay require-
ments more stringent than those of the Williams Act may not benefit,
and may even harm, shareholders.94 Additionally, obligations under a
state statute that conflict with the Williams Act could be seen as bur-
dening interstate commerce.95 Thus, the failure of the Court to rule on
the questions of preemption and direct violation of the commerce
clause leaves states without a clear guide for enactment of valid take-
over statutes.
As a result of the MITE decision, several state takeover statutes
have been held unconstitutional.96 The Tenth Circuit decision97 that
found the Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act98 unconstitutional is represen-
tive, since despite the growing number of state statutes, the use of the tender offer device has
"virtually exploded." Id Conversely, the main effect of delay may be argued to be a benefit to the
investor. A longer offering period would reduce panic and pressure on the investors to tender
their shares immediately. Furthermore, the longer period would permit the formation of an auc-
tion market for the target's stock and thus allow the investors to benefit from a higher price and
increased market for their securities. Id at 524.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 2639.
91. Id at 2644.
92. Id at 2643.
93. Id at 2642.
94. Id
95. The Supreme Court 1981 Term, supra note 84, at 67.
96. See, e.g., Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 579-82 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia); Martin-
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan); National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1133 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri).
97. Nos. 82-1838; 82-2614; 82-2615; 83-1082 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1983) (available Sept. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file).
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 431-450 (1981).
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tative of this result.
B. The Oklahoma Statute
The Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act (Oklahoma Act) was adopted
in 1981 for the purpose of providing "full, fair and effective disclosure
of all material information concerning takeover bids to shareholders of
target companies so that the opportunity of each shareholder to make
an informed investment decision may be secured." 99 As a result of the
definition of "target company" under the Oklahoma Act, the provisions
of the Oklahoma statute would govern any offer to any company that:
a. is organized under the laws of [Oklahoma], or
b. has substantial assets and its principal place of business
within [Oklahoma], or
c. has substantial assets and significant operations within
[Oklahoma], or
d. has security holders resident in [Oklahoma] who own
beneficially or of record an aggregate of ten percent (10%)
or more of any class of equity securities which are or are
about to be subject to a take-over bid."°
In MITE, the Court's finding that the Illinois Act was unconstitu-
tional turned on the influence of the statute on the nationwide securi-
ties market. This interstate influence was the result of the Illinois Act's
definition of "target company."''1 Under Illinois law, a tender offeror
could be prevented from making an offer and concluding the transac-
tion not only with resident shareholders, but also with shareholders liv-
ing in other states and having no connection with Illinois.' 02 A
comparison of the Illinois and Oklahoma statutes reveals that the cov-
erage of the Oklahoma Act was even broader than the reach of the
Illinois Act, because simple incorporation of the target under the laws
of Oklahoma, without more, would have been sufficient to invoke the
applicability of the Oklahoma Act in any takeover activity.
With respect to the required information that an offeror had to
disclose to a target company, the Oklahoma Act required that upon the
99. Id at § 432.
100. Id at § 433(4).
101. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 , § 137.52-10 (West Supp. 1983-84).
102. On its face, the Illinois Act applied even in instances when all of the shareholders were
non-residents of Illinois, since the Act applied to every tender offer for a corporation meeting two
of the following conditions: the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois, was or-
ganized under Illinois laws, or had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus repre-
sented in Illinois. Id
[Vol. 19:225
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filing of the required disclosures with the SEC, or not less than five
days prior to the commencement of the tender offer, an offeror had to
file an information statement with the administrator of the Oklahoma
Securities Commission and with the target company.10 3 Once notifica-
tion of intent to make a tender offer was presented, the statute provided
for a hearing concerning that offer.
Pursuant to the Oklahoma Act, the Administrator of the
Oklahoma Securities Commission could call a hearing to determine
whether a tender offer failed to make "full, fair and effective disclosure
to offerees of all information material to a decision to accept or reject
the offer."' "°4 Within twenty days, or for such longer period as the of-
feror might request for good cause, the Administrator had to conduct
the hearing and enter a final order."0 5 If the Administrator found that
disclosure was inadequate, this would halt the offer until such time as
disclosure was adequate. Moreover, following such a hearing, any
party could file a petition for rehearing. 0 6
Substantively, the various provisions of the Illinois and Oklahoma
Acts were very similar. This similarity allowed the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit to utilize the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
MITE to hold the Oklahoma Act unconstitutional in Mesa Petroleum
Co. v. Cities Service Co. 107
C. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co.
The Deputy Administrator of the Oklahoma Department of Se-
curities entered an appeal in the District Court for the Western District
of Oklahoma 08 from that court's injunctions against enforcement of
the Oklahoma Act. The injunctions were issued in favor of appellees
Mesa Petroleum and Occidental Petroleum.'09 Each of these corpora-
tions made tender offers to Cities Service Company that were subject to
the requirements of the Oklahoma Act. The Oklahoma district court
held that the putative local benefits were clearly outweighed by the
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 435 (1981).
104. Id at § 437(A)(2)(b).
105. Id at § 437(B).
106. Id at § 437(C).
107. Nos. 82-1838; 82-2614; 82-2615; 83-1082 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1983) (available Sept. 1,
1983, on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Courts file).
108. Id
109. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,063 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 1982); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., [1982-
83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,064 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 1982).
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burden on interstate commerce. 110 Specifically, the court stated that
the disclosure, nondiscrimination, and proration provisions of the
Oklahoma Act mirrored the Williams Act, except for additional infor-
mation that the Administrator might require at his discretion." II Thus,
the benefits of the Oklahoma Act with respect to shareholders were
deemed "purely speculative."' 1 2 Moreover, the court found that even if
the Oklahoma Act was construed to apply only to Oklahoma residents,
it still clearly would be an excessive burden on interstate commerce. 13
Not only did the court find that the Oklahoma Act was unconstitu-
tional, but it also asserted that the Act denied an offeror his right under
federal securities laws to acquire stock in a nationwide tender offer.
The denial of such a right was said to be "an irreparable loss which
[could not] be compensated in money damages." ' 14 Regarding the
Oklahoma Act, the district court said that the offeror was under a
"Sword of Damocles" that might or might not fall at the Administra-
tor's discretion."15
Acting upon the appeal by the Oklahoma Administrator, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling striking down the
Oklahoma Act because, like the Illinois Act, the statute violated the
commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 6 The Administrator of the
Oklahoma Department of Securities argued that, unlike the Illinois
Act, the Oklahoma Act (1) did not necessarily require a pre-offer filing,
at least for those offers subject to the filing requirement of the Williams
Act; (2) required that any hearing ordered by the Administrator be con-
cluded within twenty days of the initial filing; and (3) allowed only the
Administrator, not the target company, to demand a hearing. "7 The
court of appeals found that these differences fell within Judge Learned
Hand's category of "distinctions without a difference."' 1 8 The essential
point, the court said, was "bellweather clear: under the Oklahoma Act
110. Occidental, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,043; Mesa, [1982-83
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,049.
I11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 435(C), 436, 439-441 (1981).
112. Occidental, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,043; Mesa, [1982-83
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP., at 95,049.
113. Id
114. Id
115. Occidental, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,042; Mesa, [1982-83
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP., at 95,048.
116. Mesa, Nos. 82-1838; 82-2614; 82-2615; 83-1082 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1983) (available Sept.
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the Administrator may halt, indefinitely, a nationwide tender if he finds
the disclosure to be 'inadequate' by some unspecified standard."'' 1 9
The fatal flaw of the Oklahoma Act, like the Illinois Act, was the inclu-
sion of a "provision which allowed the state, under the banner of pro-
tection for its citizens, effectively to block a nationwide tender offer." 120
V. THE FUTURE OF STATE REGULATION OF TENDER OFFERS
The principal complaint concerning state regulation of tender of-
fers has been that such regulation discourages 21 and delays12 2 the
tender offer process.2 3 The fatal constitutional flaw within state stat-
utes, however, has been their burdensome effect upon transactions that
take place in the national securities market. Although it is certain that
statutes that violate the commerce clause will be held invalid, the type
of regulatory scheme that would be valid remains uncertain. Viable
future state regulation of tender offers should neither discourage, de-
lay, nor burden the tender offer process on a national level, nor sacri-
fice traditional state interests in domestic corporations and state
residents.
In adopting the Williams Act, Congress did not amend section
28(a) of the '34 Act, which in pertinent part provides: "Nothing in this
chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any
agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any se-
curity of any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder."' 2 4 In choosing
not to amend, Congress did not explicitly prohibit state regulation of
takeovers. Supporters of state regulation of takeovers have even sug-
gested that section 28(a) was plainly intended to protect, rather than
limit, state authority.2 5  Nevertheless, in order to avoid friction be-
119. Id
120. Id
121. For a statistical summary of the effects of the Williams Act on the number of tender
offers, see ADVISORY CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 11 n.9.
122. See supra note 89.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
125. It has been argued, however, that this savings clause is inapplicable to the regulation of
tender offers because section 28 was part of the original '34 Act and was designed to protect state
blue sky laws, not takeover statutes. Furthermore, some commentators suggest the state laws are
analagous to corporate law rather than securities law; therefore, it is too mechanical to suggest
that the savings clause was intended to apply to state takeover legislation. Langevoort, supra note
26, at 247. Some commentators have argued that the Williams Act enunciates a national policy so
pervasive that congressional intent may be inferred to exclude state regulation. Wilner & Landy,
supra note 5, at 25, 30 (certain provisions of the Williams Act have such a substantive effect on
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tween the substantive and procedural requisites of the state and federal
regulatory schemes, it is important that "the appropriate balance be-
tween the overlapping regulatory structures" be achieved. 126
The MITE and Mesa decisions, along with others adopting their
reasoning, 127 suggest that any state regulation of bidder activity that
potentially discourages or delays tender offers will be found to impose
substantial burdens on interstate commerce. Because local businesses
have little to gain by encouraging the demise of takeover statutes, the
impetus to strike down those statutes must come from potential offerors
or from an appropriate governmental body. Potential offerors, how-
ever, may have little or no voice in the political process of the state that
is attempting to impose its statutory requirements on the offeror. Thus,
the political check on unduly burdensome regulation is effectively left
to Congress, the state legislatures, the SEC, or the courts.
Because Justice White's preemption analysis in MITE did not re-
ceive the support of the Court, 128 the lower courts are left to apply
MITE to various state statutes on a case-by-case basis. Clearly, the
Court has rejected any extraterritorial effect of the various state statutes
as unconstitutional, and it also appears to have rejected any assertion
that the state statutes enhance the protections the Williams Act offers
within the state's borders.'2 9 Using the same analysis, it would seem
equally clear that the intention of the state statutes could only be the
insulation of local target companies from "possible liquidation or relo-
cation of corporate assets and the consequent loss of local revenue and
employment."'' 30
Given such an obvious conffict between the state statutes and the
Williams Act, "the Court should have nullified the Illinois Act on
supremacy clause grounds as well as on the commerce clause
grounds."' 3 1 Because the Court did not hold on the preemption issue,
it did not expressly negate the possibility of state regulation of inter-
state tender offers. 132 Therefore, it is up to other governing bodies to
eliminate the investing public's unnecessary confusion, to obviate bur-
tender offers that Congress' delineation of one method was intended not as a minimum standard
but as the standard to be applied in every state).
126. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
127. See supra note 96.
128. See supra text accompanying note 84.
129. MITE, 102 S. Ct. at 2642-43.
130. Note, supra note 33, at 528.
131. The Death Knell, supra note 84, at 525.
132. 102 S. Ct. at 2640.
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densome litigation, and to prevent countless hours of debate within
state legislatures.
Troubled by the reluctance of courts to find state takeover statutes
unconstitutional based on the present federal regulatory scheme, the
SEC has designed rules to conflict with state provisions and has an-
nounced that "the rules effectively do away with state statutes."' 133
Bemoaning the failure of the courts to find that the Williams Act
preempts state law, the SEC has pressed for an amendment to the '34
Act to specifically preempt state takeover statutes. 134 Because action by
the SEC "could be characterized as a use of rulemaking power to gain
exclusive regulatory authority in derogation of congressional intent," 135
it would be preferable for Congress to resolve the lingering uncertain-
ties.' 36 Congress should give careful scrutiny to the advantages and
disadvantages of permitting state regulation with an eye toward balanc-
ing state and national interests in takeover regulation. 137
The SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers has recom-
mended that state regulation of takeovers be confined to local compa-
nies. 138  It has suggested that the definition of "local companies"
include only those companies with more than fifty percent of their vot-
ing shares held within the state of incorporation, and any company in-
cluded within the definition should not be listed on a national securities
exchange.'39 Furthermore, the aggregate market value of the voting
stock held by non-affiliated stockholders should be twenty million dol-
lars or less."' Finally, the annual trading volume of such stock should
be less than one million shares.' 4 1 Although the more-than-fifty-per-
cent requirement would eliminate the problem of multiple state take-
over statutes applying to any one offer, the applicability of such a
statute would be limited; in actuality, the number of tender offers for
such local companies might be negligible.
Because of the extreme limitations imposed upon state regulation
by the Constitution, the SEC, and the courts, it is clear that bidders'
133. McCauliff, Federalism and the Constitutlonality of State Takeover Statutes, 67 VA. L. REV.
295, 311 (1981).
134. Id at 312.
135. Id
136. Id at 313; see also The Supreme Court 1981 Term, supra note 84, at 71 (supporting con-
gressional, rather than SEC, preemption).
137. McCauliff, supra note 133, at 313; The Supreme Court 1981 Term, supra note 84, at 71.
138. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
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activities are, and will continue to be, governed largely by federal law.
The response of the target company to the takeover bid, however, well
may be subject to state statutory and common law.'42
Espousing a balance between minimal preemption of traditional
state corporate law and maintenance of the integrity of the national
securities market, the Advisory Committee has recommended a system
of state regulation of domestic corporations' internal affairs and state-
by-state application of the business judgment rule as a tender offer con-
trol mechanism.1 43 "Broadly speaking, the Committee believes that the
business judgment rule should be the principal governor of decisions
made by corporate management including decisions that may alter the
likelihood of a takeover.'" Nonetheless, in keeping with the current
judicial trend, the Advisory Committee condemned support of any
mechanism which interferes with takeovers in the national market-
place, including "the use of charter and by-law provisions that erect
high barriers to change of control and thus operate against the interests
of shareholders and the national marketplace."'' 45
Defensive ploys are being studied and adopted by hundreds of
companies.146 These defenses include such tactics as staggered direc-
torships, 47  fair price amendments, 148  golden parachute arrange-
ments, 49 employment of Wall Street takeover and proxy-solicitation
firms for special studies and projects, 5 ° supermajority provisions,'"'
142. Id at 34.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id at 36.
146. Metz, Foiling Suitors, To Forestall Takeovers, Many Concerns Move to Shore Up De-
fenses, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1983, at I, col. 8.
147. Staggered elections make it difficult to change the target's board of directors. LIPTON &
STEINBERGER, supra note 1, at 62.
148. "Fair price" amendments are attempts to ensure that, after a partial takeover, the remain-
ing shareholders get a good price for their stock. Metz, supra note 146.
149. "Golden parachute" arrangements are "[a]rrangements that provide change of control
related compensation to company managers or employees." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 38.
Justifications articulated for contracts that become operative only in the event of a
change of control are based on the issuer's interests in attracting and retaining high qual-
ity management, in keeping management's attention on running the business, and in
aligning management's interests more closely with those of shareholders when an offer
for the company is at hand.
Id at 39.
150. Metz, supra note 146.
151. "Supermajority provisions" are charter provisions that require more than the statutorily
imposed minimum vote requirement to accomplish a merger. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 38.
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disenfranchisement, 5 2  standstill agreements, 53 self tenders, 54
countertenders,-'" stock and asset transactions,1 56 third-party asset
sales, 5 7 use of employee benefit plans,'58 block repurchases at a pre-
mium, 5 9 "stock-watches",160 and acquisitions creating antitrust imped-
iments to the takeover.' 61 These defensive ploys, however, may be
limited by state statute.
The Advisory Committee considered protective charter amend-
ments 162 appropriate when adopted with full disclosure of their effects
and ratified regularly. 163 Protective charter amendments adopted after
the commencement of a takeover, however, were believed to be inap-
propriate. The market then has no chance to assimilate the informa-
tion into the price of the company's stock and offerors lack the
opportunity to reflect the consequences of such avoidance mechanisms
in their offers. If shareholders are involved in adopting the provisions,
152. "Charter provisions (other than cumulative voting and class voting) that abandon the
one-share, one-vote rule based on the concentration of ownership within a class (e.g., formulas
diluting voting strength of 10% shareholders, and 'majority of the disinterested shareholders' ap-
proval requirements)." Id
153. Standstill agreements are "[clurrent agreements with remaining lives longer than one
year that restrict or prohibit purchases or sales of the company's stock by a party to the agree-
ment." Id
154. "The target may seek to repurchase its own shares. This tactic will serve to distribute
'unwanted' cash and reduce the 'float' (shares held by shareholders most likely to accept a tender
offer)." FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 149 (1979).
155. Countertenders, frequently called the "Pac-Man defense", occur when the target com-
pany makes a tender offer for the securities of the original bidder. Coming to terms with takeover
lingo, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 12, 1983, at 11, col 1.
156. "Arrangements or options to sell stock or assets to a preferred acquiror (generally re-
ferred to as 'leg-ups' or 'lock-ups')." ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 44. These
arrangements often are necessary to induce a takeover contest among bidders. Id
157. Third-party asset sales are the sales of significant assets by a target company during the
course of a tender offer. Id at 45.
158. Target companies may attempt to use an employee benefit plan to thwart a takeover bid
by (1) instructing the retirement plan managers not to tender company shares held by the plan to
an unapproved bidder, and (2) instructing the plan managers to purchase company stock with a
view to defeating a hostile tender offer. Id at 45.
159. Popularly denominated "greenmail," this tactic involves the "purchase of a substantial
block of a target company's stock by an unfriendly suitor with the primary purpose of coercing the
target company into repurchasing the block at a premium over the amount paid by the suitor."
Christian Sci. Monitor, supra note 155.
160. "Stock watches" are early-warning ploys, wherein a target makes it a "personal assign-
ment to find out who's behind every trade" that involves more than a certain percentage of stock.
Metz, supra note 146, at p. 15, col. I.
161. "Once the identity of the bidder or potential bidder is known, the target may acquire a
company in a competing or related industry and seek protection under the antitrust laws."
FLEISCHER, supra note 154, at 28-33.
162. ADVISORY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 34-46.
163. Id at 37.
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it is under pressured circumstances.164
The business judgment rule and the principles of fiduciary duty, as
interpreted by the state judiciary, also provide protection to sharehold-
ers against abusive defense techniques. The general rule is that direc-
tors may reject a takeover bid if they act on a reasonable basis and in
good faith.' 65 Courts, in general, have supported the target directors'
right to reject a tender offer because of inadequacy of price, 66 illegality
of the offer,167 illegality of the acquisition of control of the target by the
raider, 6 8 and concern with the effect of the takeover on the employees
of the target and the surrounding community. 69 Moreover, there are
statistics indicating that of the thirty-six unsolicited tender offers that
were rejected and defeated by target management between December
1973 and June 1979, in more than fifty percent of the cases as of August
1979, the shareholders were better off than if the tender offer had been
successful.' 70 State regulation of target defense ploys, therefore, tem-
pered by the business judgment rule and the principles of fiduciary
duty, would appear to benefit resident shareholders and corporations.
As a result of the MITE decision, however, any state sanction of corpo-
rate defense ploys erected under the guise of the business judgment rule
or fiduciary duty must be able to survive a judicial determination that
the action does not constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.
164. Id
165. See, e.g., Anaconda Co, v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210,1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (business-
man, exercising proper business judgment, allowed to reject tender offer); Northwest Indus., Inc,
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (management, in its best judgment,
responsible to oppose offers detrimental to company or shareholders).
166. See, e.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y.) (target management of A & P found offer price inadequate), af'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d
Cir. 1973).
167. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-23 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(target management's "legitimate concerns" about raider's potential violations of securities laws
proper exercise of fiduciary duty).
168. Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,286, at 92,823-34 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978) (offer raised antitrust questions).
169. Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 1972) (directors of newspaper
justified in averting a takeover having adverse impact on the character and quality of the newspa-
per and leading to poor relations with employees).
170. In January 1977, Viacom rejected a $20 takeover bid, reflecting a premium of 95
percent over the then market price of $10.25, by Storer Broadcasting; at the end of No-
vember 1980, Viacom was at $57.25.
In October 1978, Freeport Minerals purchased for $14.00, reflecting a premium of
19 percent over the then market price of $11.78, about 10 percent of its shares from
Denison Mines, which had accumulated the shares through market purchases; at the end
of November 1980, Freeport Minerals was at $61.25.
Lipton, supra note 6, at 1025.
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The tender offer process has been regulated by both state and fed-
eral governments since 1968. During this concurrent regulatory period,
states assumed extraterritorial jurisdiction under the auspices of pro-
tecting local interests and governing internal affairs of domestic corpo-
rations. Although the effect of these state regulations conflicted with
the policy supporting the Williams Act, the courts allowed this regula-
tory morass until the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, holding that
the Illinois State Takeover Statute was an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce.
Despite the current trend toward federal deregulation,' 7 ' and be-
cause of the exigency of judicial economy, Congress should preempt
state regulation of bidder activity except when tender offers involve lo-
cal companies only. Concomitantly, state regulation of domestic cor-
porations should take a fiduciary approach that will promote legitimate
local interests and protect investors. Whether this scheme of uniform
federal regulation of bidder activity and state regulation of target de-
fense ploys will balance the interests on both sides and protect the
shareholder in the middle remains uncertain. The achievement of such
a balance will depend upon the creation of an efficient marketplace
wherein a shareholder may rely upon the comprehensive business judg-
ment of his company's management.
Robin Antoinette Rainey
171. McCauliff, supra note 133, at 296 n.7 ("deregulation of airline fares and trucking rates,
together with careful congressional scrutiny of the Federal Trade Commission and a pending bill
to deregulate rail fares, exemplify the recent trend toward deregulation").
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